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NOTES
ARE JUDGEMENT CREDITORS IN A BETTER POSITION NOW
THAT DIVORCE CHANGES TENANCY BY ENTIRETIES
TO TENANCY IN COMMON?1
One of the traditional incidents of property held by husband and wife as ten-
ants by entireties has been the exemption of this property from execution and
sale by a judgment creditor of one or the other of the two tenants as individuals.2
The reason generally given for this immunity is that the legal unity of husband
and wife resulting from marriage gives this estate the peculiarity of being owned
wholly by one individual in the eyes of the law. Practically, this means that the
whole estate is vested in the husband and the whole estate is vested in the wife
from its inception. Therefore, since both own the whole estate, enforcing the
judgment against one tenant would be taking the property of one to pay the debt
of another.8
It would seem that once this unity had been destroyed by divorce the tenancy
by entireties would be changed to a tenancy in common. Hence, judgment credi-
tors would be in a better position. The majority of courts have adopted this view, 4
while the Pennsylvania courts have remained in the minority.5 The Pennsylvania
courts have said 6 that the tenancy by entireties continues because "the quality of
the estate is determined at its inception... The divorce severed the unity of per-
son for the future, but it could not avail retrospectively to sever the vested unity
of title and possession." Under this interpretation the judgment creditor had no
more chance of collecting from the two unmarried individuals than he had when
the two were man and wife.
Act No. 412, General Assembly 1949,7 would seem to be an attempt by
the legislature to remedy this situation. This act provided in part as follows:
I For effect of separation on tenancy by entireties, see 47 DICK. L. REV. 228.
2 McCurdy and Stevenson v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39 (1870); Myer's Estate (No. 1), 232 Pa,
89, 81 A. 145 (1911); Weiss v. Beihl, 232 Pa. 97, 81 A. 148 (1911); Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa.
519, 84 A. 953 (1912).
3 Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 522-3, 84 A. 953 (1912).
4 27 C. J. S. 839; 10 ORE. L. REV. 206.
5 27 C. J. S. 839, note 2; Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 66 A. 81 (1907) ; O'Malley v. O'Malley,
272 Pa. 528, 116 A. 500 (1922).
0 Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604, 607-8, 66 A. 81 (1907). The Pennsylvania courts have modified
this rule in the case of rents, saying that after divorce for all practical purposes between themselves
husband and wife are tenants in common: O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa. 528, 116 A. 500 (1922) ;
Stimson v. Stimson, 343 Pa. 68, 29 A.2d 679 (1943); Mertz v. Mertz, 139 Pa. Super. 299, 11
A.2d 514 (1940).
71 Act No. 412, S. B. 781, "An act to amend the title and the act approved the tenth day of
May, one thousand nine hundred twenty-seven (Pamphlet Laws 884), entitled 'An act modifying
the common law rule relating to property hereafter acquired by husband and wife as tenants by
entireties, where such husband and wife are subsequently divorced; providing for the sale of prop-
erty held by husband and wife as tenants by entireties where they have been divorced; and directing
the disposition of the proceeds of such sale,' by providing for the creation of a tenancy in common
upon divorce." Approved 17 May 1949. Reported in Purdons Pennsylvania Legislative Service 1949,
No. 5, pp. 1384-5. Effective 1 September 1949 as provided by 46 P. S. 504.
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"Be it enacted that whenever any husband and wife hereafter acquir-
ing property as tenants by entireties, shall be divorced, they shall there-
after hold such property as tenants in common of equal one half shares
in value. .. "
Prior to the enactment of this statute the judgment creditor of tither the
divorced husband or the divorced wife could possibly have obtained satisfaction
of his judgment, if at all, in one of three ways:
1. Should the two tenants sever the unity by voluntarily joining in a con-
veyance of the property to the one member who was the judgment debtor or by
a partition of the property,8 each taking a separate interest, the judgment creditor
could have execution and sale of that interest vesting in the judgment debtor. Such
conveyance or partition would, of course, be highly unlikely in the face of a judg-
ment lien.
2. Should one tenant die leaving the estate vested in the tenant who was the
judgment debtor the creditor could have execution and sale of this estate in sev-
eralty. The Pennsylvania courts have held that the lien of a judgment against one
tenant by entirety is limited to the tenant's right upon survivorship to succession
to the whole estate. And this is an inchoate lien unenforceable until the expectancy
of survivorship is a fact.9 Therefore, a creditor of one of two such divorced ten-
ants, both of whom were living, couldn't be said to possess very much, if anything.
3. The third possibility the judgment creditor had for the satisfaction of his
judgment was that situation arising by virtue of statute passed in 1927.10 This
statute provides:
"Whenever any husband and wife hereafter acquiring property as ten-
ants by entireties shall be divorced either of such tenants by entireties
may bring suit in the Court of Common Pleas, sitting in Equity, of the
county where the land is situate, against the other to have the property
sold and the proceeds divided between them..
And further provided,
"the amount of any liens entered of record against either of such ten-
ants by entireties together with interest due and costs taxed thereon
shall be deducted from the share of the tenant by entireties against whom
such lien is filed, and paid by such trustee to the person or persons to
whom the same is due and payable. ..
Therefore, after divorce, on forced sale by one of the tenants the judgment
creditor might recover the value of his lien. However, the creditor was depend-
ent on action by one of the two tenants and had no standing following a divorce
8 Michalski v. Kruszewski, 330 Pa. 62, 198 A. 673 (1938).
9 C. I. T. Corporation v. Flint, 333 Pa. 350, 355, 5 A.2d 126, 166 A. L. R. 992 (1939).
10 P. L. 884, 68 P. S. 501-5, May 10, 1927-to which the statute under consideration is an
amendment.
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to institute proceedings himself for a public sale of the property." Moreover, it
must be noted that this act did not apply to all tenancies by entireties but only
to those created after the effective date thereof, 1 September 1927. The benefit
of this act to the judgment creditor of one of the divorced tenants of a tenancy
by entireties is, therefore, quite limited.
The three possibilities which the judgment creditor had for thL satisfaction
of his claim against the divorced tenant are seen to be very small and left him
in a very poor position.' 2 The present statute would seem to be an attempt to remedy
this situation. How effective it will be remains to be seen. As yet, there are no
cases interpreting the act. It should be noted that the statute applies only to
tenancies by the entireties created after the effective date of tht act, 1 September
1949. We must look at the general rul's and Pennsylvania cases to determine
the relationship of one tenant in common and his judgment creditor.
Generally speaking, a tenant in common is the same as a tenant in severalty
except that his right to possession is not exclusive. He has a right to possession of
all the property and has no right to excludt his cotenants from the same right of
possession.
"Tenants in common hold by several and distinct titles, with unity of
possession only. No privity ofestate exists between them but as between
themselves their interests are several, there being no unity of title,
each owner being considered solely and severally seized of his share."'8
"A tenant in common though he owns an undivided share only has a
separate and distinct estate, and, except for the fact that he does not
have exclusive possession, has the same rights in respect to his share as
a tenant in stveralty.'"14
If the estate of a cotenant does have these attributes which make it separate
and distinct it would seem that execution on and sale of that interest would be
perfectly feasible. The Pennsylvania cases follow this view. In Hopkins v. Forsyth,
14 Pa. 34, thL court held that execution on a judgment against two members of
a group of persons who owned a steamboat as tenants in common and the resulting
sale of the steamboat in no way affected the title of those tenants in common who
were not debtors under the judgment, unless they had consented to have their
interest sold in return for a proportional share in the proceeds of the sale. Again,
in Arnold v. Cessna, 25 Pa. 34, where a judgment for purchase money had been
recovered against one of two persons who held equitable title to property as ten-
ants in common and the property had been sold in satisfaction of the judgment,
the court held that the heirs of the non-debtor tenant still had perfectly good title
11 Eastern Acceptance Corporation v. Gold, 60 D. & C. 95 (Pa. 1947).
12 For summary of methods of terminating tenancy by entireties, see 53 DimK. L. REv. 131.
13 62 C. J. 409, § 4.
14 TIPI'ANY, REAL PIROPERTY, § 285, p. 287 (1940).
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to a one half interest in the equitable title as tenants in common with the pur-
chaser at the sale.
And so Pennsylvania follows the general rule that the property of tenants
in common is liable to be levied upon under an execution against one of them,
and the share of the execution debtor therein may be sold to satisfy the judgment.
Applying these principles to the statute here under consideration, it would
seem that the judgment creditor has been put in a more advantageous position.
Providing that the tenancy by entireties in question came into existence after
the effective date of this act, 1 September 1949, the judgment creditor would ap-
pear to have a right to have execution and sale of the one half share of the judg-
ment debtor in the jointly held property any time after the divorce decree was
entered.
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